Legislature(2003 - 2004)
03/10/2003 01:03 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
|---|
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HB 2 - CIVIL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS/SEX OFFENSES Number 0041 CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the first order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 2, "An Act relating to the statute of limitations for certain civil actions; and providing for an effective date." REPRESENTATIVE KEVIN MEYER, Alaska State Legislature, speaking as the sponsor of HB 2, explained that HB 2 is simply a [housekeeping measure] that would clean up some of the impacts of an amendment to HB 210, which was passed during the 22nd legislature. House Bill 2 clarifies which misdemeanors and felonies involving sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor will have a three-year statute of limitations, and which will have no statute of limitations at all. He informed the committee that HB 210 originally would have dropped the statute of limitations on felony sexual assault crimes and on [felony] sexual abuse of a minor crimes. However, he added, there was an amendment on the House floor to include all civil actions [pertaining to these crimes] as well. In theory, this sounded good, he remarked, but [there were unintended consequences]. He pointed out that under HB 210, there is no definition of felony sexual abuse of a minor and felony sexual assault was not defined by reference to any particular sections in law. Therefore, it was uncertain which felonies wouldn't fall under the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the amendment to HB 210 didn't address misdemeanor sexual abuse and [misdemeanor] sexual assault; the civil statute of limitations for those misdemeanors automatically dropped to two years, which is the [statute of limitation] for torts in general. The crimes that were inadvertently changed to have a two-year statute of limitation were misdemeanor sexual assault, misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, incest, felony indecent exposure, and unlawful exploitation of a minor. Prior to the floor amendment to HB 210, all of the aforementioned crimes had three-year statute of limitations. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER informed the committee that HB 2 also deals with unlawful exploitation of a minor, which is a class B felony. The intent is to include class B felonies with those crimes that don't have a statute of limitations. He reiterated that his intent is to make all misdemeanor sexual assault crimes [and misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor crimes] have a three- year statute of limitations. Therefore, HB 2 has a retroactive clause. CHAIR McGUIRE asked if any cases that would have been covered by HB 210 have occurred since that bill passed. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER said he didn't know. However, he didn't believe that there's a lot of civil action regarding sexual assault cases and sexual abuse of a minor cases. He reiterated the desire to have the unlimited statute of limitations in case someone wanted to take action 20-30 years from now. He explained that his focus is on the criminal side because with DNA evidence, one can now prove something that happened 20-25 years ago. Number 0459 PAM FINLEY, Revisor of Statutes, Legislative Legal and Research Division, Legislative Affairs Agency, explained that she became involved with this matter because last year the revisor's bill proposed a slightly different fix to HB 210. However, it was clear that the legislature wasn't comfortable with the ramifications of that format and thus the fix has been introduced as separate legislation - HB 2. MS. FINLEY said that normally an amendment such as the one adopted for HB 210 wouldn't be problematic. However, this area of [law] is intertwined with other areas and thus this one change had a ripple effect. For everything but the felony sexual abuse of minor and felony sexual assault, the statute of limitations on the civil side went from three years to two years, which was an unintended [consequence of the amendment made to HB 210]. Section 2 of HB 2 undoes the aforementioned, and places unlawful exploitation of a minor into the no-statute- of-limitations category. Section 3 is essentially a technical amendment. She explained that the statute of limitations for the crime of sexual abuse of a minor doesn't begin until the minor turns 18 years old. For some cases, there are more rules when the minor is under 16 years of age. Ms. Finley pointed out that claims brought under AS 09.55.650 include things that no longer have a statute of limitations. She turned to the retroactivity section and relayed that generally, statute of limitations are considered procedural matters and thus can be changed retroactively. She offered her belief that this retroactivity should be acceptable. However, since the Alaska Supreme Court hasn't spoken on this matter yet, the language "to the extent permitted by the constitution" is included. Number 0712 REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG recalled from his prior time in the legislature that there was a policy against inserting phrases beginning with "Notwithstanding other provisions of law". He inquired as to why that language is now being used. He said, "It's always notwithstanding everything else; you can put that in every single clause." MS. FINLEY expressed the hope that such language isn't used in every single clause because then there would be dueling "Notwithstanding" clauses, which she understood to be the point Representative Gruenberg was raising. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG recommended eliminating the aforementioned language from [Sections 1 and 2] because it is clear [without the language]. MS. FINLEY informed the committee that the "Notwithstanding" in Section 1 was the result of the floor amendment [to HB 210]. Therefore, when Section 2 was drafted it duplicated the language in Section 1. Ms. Finley said that she didn't believe it would be a problem to eliminate the "Notwithstanding" language from Section 1 and 2. Number 0840 REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG turned to the retroactivity provision, and remarked that it is necessary because without it, there may be some causes of action that may have been extinguished. MS. FINLEY agreed. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG directed attention to the language, "To the extent permitted by the state and federal constitutions" on page 2, line 24. He asked if that is tautological and always the case. MS. FINLEY agreed that it's always the case. However, that language was included to indicate that there may be some retroactive applications that are valid and some that aren't and the intent is to preserve those that are [valid]. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether [the language] is really necessary. Wouldn't a court simply interpret it that way? MS. FINLEY said the [language was included] in order to clarify the intent. In further response to Representative Gruenberg, Ms. Finley explained that all retroactive legislation is immediately effective. Without an immediate effective date, the legislation would be retroactive but wouldn't be retroactive until 90 days out. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said he wasn't sure that logically that follows. When the laws become effective and it's retroactive, it means that one can't file a lawsuit for 90 days. As a matter of policy, Representative Gruenberg said, he has a problem with making things retroactive. MS. FINLEY informed the committee that the drafting manual specifies that for retroactive legislation, [the drafter] should try to use an immediate effective date. CHAIR McGUIRE referred to a memorandum from Mike Ford, Attorney, Legislative Legal and Research Services, that was drafted on another matter. That memorandum addressed retroactivity by specifying, "The modern view appears to be that retroactive enactments of the legislature will be upheld against a due process challenge if the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." MS. FINLEY relayed her belief that the immediate effective date for the retroactive clause is necessary in order to have things happen as quickly as possible. She informed the committee of the ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. State, 824 P.2d 708 (Alaska 1992) case in which the effective date failed, but the courts still upheld the retroactivity clause. CHAIR McGUIRE again referred to Mr. Ford's memorandum and pointed out that it specifies that passage of retroactivity serves as an immediate effective date upon passage. Number 1134 REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to adopt Conceptual Amendment 1, to remove the "Notwithstanding" clauses from Sections 1 and 2 on page 1, lines 6 and 13. REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked if Ms. Finley feels that the legislation as written needs to be changed in order to accomplish its purpose. MS. FINLEY answered that keeping the "Notwithstanding" language doesn't do any harm. However, she said she also didn't believe that there would be a great deal of harm in eliminating the "Notwithstanding" language because the courts will always take the specific statute over the general statute. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG interjected to say that it had been a policy to not use such language unless necessary. CHAIR McGUIRE noted that were no objections to Conceptual Amendment 1. Therefore, Conceptual Amendment 1 was adopted. Number 1219 REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG moved to report HB 2, as amended, out of committee with individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal notes. There being no objection, CSHB 2(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|